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The American Civil War was a transformative time for military pensions. 
Previous legislation had established a legal framework for pensions and widow 
benefits, but the nature of the war created a need for a new plan to serve the 
veterans of the Civil War, as well as any future wars. The United States federal 
government thus enacted major legislation and policies to change the pension plan 
many times from the start of the war in 1861 through 1912. Changes to the pension 
law, including benefit increases and new beneficiaries, and the politics behind some 
of the decisions are included to provide a historical context for the plan. The actual 
costs ofthe pension plan under these numerous pensions acts during the 
Reconstruction-era were often not in agreement with the original estimates. As an 
attempt to better estimate the costs for the legislation, I have conducted an actuarial 
valuation of the pension plan as of the passage of the Consolidation Act of 1873. 
Actuarial assumptions and methodology are reviewed, and an analysis of the results 
ofthe valuation and the actual payments made by the Pension Bureau follows. 
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The American Civil War was a turning point in our nation's history. An entire 
group of people was freed from slavery and became citizens. Meanwhile, hundreds 
of thousands of men died as they fought each other and suffered diseases and 
inadequate medical treatment. For those who served the Union and managed to 
survive the war, a return to normalcy was a long process. With the medical 
treatment for soldiers being quite poor, veterans often had debilitating disabilities. 
Prior military pension laws existed for those men who served as well as any 
widows, but these laws were written for previous wars such as the Revolutionary 
War and the War of 1812. Clearly, a revised and modern pension code was needed 
to aid the veterans. The Reconstruction era and the following turn of the century 
saw a large increase in pension legislation designed for the increasing benefit of the 
veterans and their widows, often with little regard for actual costs. 
Because of the mismatch between the cost estimates often given by the 
government when determining whether or not to vote for new legislation and the 
experience of the Pension Bureau following passage, I conducted an actuarial 
valuation. This valuation is intended to better model the costs of the pension plan 
than the other estimates. The background of the pension plan explains the changing 
nature of the plan and its benefits, as well as the forces behind said changes. An 
overview of the valuation process and the results follow. Finally, the comparison of 
the valuation to the actual payments is included. 
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2. History ofthe Civil War Pension Plan 
The Civil War hostilities began with the bombardment of Fort Sumter in 
South Carolina on April 12, 1861, but no pension legislation was introduced until 
July 22 of that year. This legislation actually authorized President Lincoln to accept 
up to five hundred thousand volunteers for service in the escalating war. In an 
attempt to entice more volunteers to enter service, Congress included a provision in 
the law that allowed these volunteers the same benefits as regular soldiers and 
sailors for any disability suffered during the course of the war. It also allowed for 
payments of arrears and a lump sum benefit of one hundred dollars to the widows. 
This structure was similar to previous military pensions, and since the war was not 
expected to continue for very long, the cost and legal framework was thought to be 
of small importance. 
Problems began to arise from this legislation with soldiers who fought in the 
earlier battles like the Battle of Bull Run who were called up by Lincoln's prior 
proclamations. These men did not fall under the umbrella of the volunteers of the 
July 22 law, but certain provisions of older laws seemed to allow for some of these 
men to receive benefits. Because of this, it was generally agreed that some new 
legislation would be required to properly clarify the law. Congress agreed and on 
July 14, 1862, a new military pension system specifically for the Civil War was 
authorized. The structure of the plan was again of disability income and benefits for 
widows and their children. The only requirement for receiving these benefits was 
that the disabilities or death of the soldier had to be a direct result of their service 
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during the war. Things such as losing limbs, sight, or death in battle would have 
been legitimate sources of claims under this law, but injuries or death related to 
post-war causes would not be covered. 
A crucial part of the pension legislation of 1862 was that it specifically barred 
previous pensioners ofthe rebelling states from receiving their benefits. These were 
all men who had served before during such wars as the Mexican-American War and 
the Indian Wars and had been receiving some form of compensation for their 
service. This practice had already been the policy of the Pension Bureau before 
passage of the legislation, but the law merely made the practice an explicitly legal 
one. The Bureau dropped from its rolls the names ofthose known to have taken up 
arms in service to the Confederate States of America. As the southern states were 
reconquered and incorporated back into the Union, the Bureau would reenroll the 
men it had previously stricken from its rolls. The Bureau, Congress, and the general 
mood of America was such that while these veterans of former wars may be entitled 
to pensions they earned during service to the USA, no soldiers would be entitled to 
any benefits for injuries or death sustained while in service to the CSA. This 
significantly narrowed the reach of the Civil War pension plan specifically to the 
Union armies alone. 
Another important aspect of the pension legislation from 1862 relates to 
potential beneficiaries. Before this legislation, it was thought that payments of a 
soldier's pension to his widow and her children upon his death was fair enough. The 
language of the new act allowed for the widows and children (until they reached age 
sixteen) as usual, but it also expanded benefits to new claimants: mothers and 
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orphaned sisters. It was reasoned that if these people were dependant on the soldier 
for income and assistance, they should receive the pension, provided that there was 
no widow and children with first claim. This class expanded further in 1868 to 
include fathers and orphaned brothers as well, though they naturally were behind 
the mothers and orphaned sisters. 
The amount of benefits dispensed to the veterans and their beneficiaries was 
defined according to how close to total disability a veteran was. This was 
determined through a system of deputized surgeons who would examine each 
applicant and pass judgment on the disabilities claimed. An amount payable for total 
disability was set, with amounts for injuries of a lesser degree determined largely at 
the discretion of the examining surgeon. This lack of uniformity resulted in a 
schedule of amounts to be paid for a specific disability to be included in 
supplemental pension legislation in 1864. This schedule, as well as future changes to 
it, is reproduced below as Table 1. 
As the war progressed and eventually was resolved, many men were 
returning from the fighting in a poorer state than when they left. These men had left 
their jobs and livelihood for several years, those in the areas of the fighting had lost 
or sustained damage to property, and many of these men returned with physical 
disabilities. This population of impoverished men presented both a problem and an 
opportunity to Congress. These politicians quickly realized that the veterans could 
be an important political force, and as an effort to aide them in their poverty as well 
as a way to win votes for future elections, Congress began to increase the rates at 
which the disabled veterans would be paid. From the establishment of a uniform 
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rate schedule in 1864, there were seventeen changes to the schedule, all of them 
having increased and expanded benefits 1. 
Following the legislation in 1864, several more changes were made to the 
pension plan. Enough was deemed to be contradictory and confusing by politicians 
and the then-Commissioner of Pensions, so Congress again took up the issue of a 
pension bill. This bill became the Consolidation Act of 1873. Older legislation 
deemed to be ambiguous was clearly defined in the new act. New pensionable 
disabilities were added, as well as increased rates. For many, the passage of the 
Consolidation Act of 1873 was considered to be the final word for military pensions 
for the near future 2. 
The next significant change to the pension plan was the Arrears Act of 1879. 
As the name suggests, the act was primarily concerned with the payment of arrears, 
though of pension benefits instead of military pay. The legislation of 1862 set a 
limitation for the back payment of pension benefits at one year from the date of 
discharge. Thus a soldier would have a year from his date of honorable discharge 
from service to apply for a pension and still receive those benefits between his 
application date and his date of discharge. Subsequent laws modified this 
timeframe, with the date eventually moving to five years from the date of discharge. 
Despite this range being a fairly reasonable length of time to for a veteran to exhibit 
a disability and apply for a full pension, groups such as the veterans, pension agents 
wanting greater commissions, six state legislatures, and the House of 
Representatives deemed this not liberal enough. The United States Senate disagreed 
1 Glasson p.133. 
2 Oliver p. 39. 
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and twice tabled bills for an expansion of arrears that had passed the House of 
Representatives with two-thirds majorities. At the same time, Civil War veterans 
were organizing groups to lobby for their interests whenever new legislation 
cropped up. One of the more influential of these voices was the veterans' interest 
paper, National Tribune, devoted exclusively to veterans' affairs in general and 
pensioners specifically. This confluence of factors resulted in an arrears bill finally 
being debated by the Senate in January of 1879. 
The House legislation determined that all back payments of arrears were to 
be paid from the date of discharge (or death in the case of widowed applicants) to 
the date of application. The Commissioner of Pensions forwarded to the Senate 
Committee on Pensions a report from a few years prior detailing a cost estimate for 
a similar proposal. In the report, the Commissioner estimated that the bill would not 
require more than fifteen million dollars. No sooner had the bill passed the Senate 
and been sent offto President Hayes for his signature, then numerous media outlets 
begin speculating about the risk of underestimating the true costs of the bill. 
This led to an intense several days while the Hayes administration 
recalculated its expected costs in an effort to determine whether or not to veto the 
passed bill. The Secretary of the Treasury estimated that the total cost would be 
around one hundred and fifty million dollars, while a recalculation on the part of the 
Pension Bureau estimated the cost at seventy-five million. The Secretary of the 
Interior (to whom the Pension Bureau reported) believed total costs would be along 
the lines of fifty million dollars. After an intense discussion of methods of paying for 
these sums that included suspending the sinking fund to pay down the national debt 
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as well as measures to increase duties on tea and coffee, President Hayes signed the 
bill as a fulfillment of a promise previously made to soldiers. The political calculus 
being what it was, it's likely that had Hayes released his Cabinet's estimations and 
refused to sign the bill, Congress would likely have paused at the large cost being 
imposed on the nation3. 
As part of the deliberation of appropriations for the newly passed measure, 
the Commissioner of Pensions requested thirty-four million dollars from the House 
just to payout arrears claims for the 1880 fiscal year. The Senate agreed to give the 
Bureau twenty-five million. After a lengthy and vociferous debate about minor and 
unrelated political matters, the Senate agreed that any veteran expecting to claim 
arrears all the way back to their date of discharge had until the start of the 1881 
fiscal year to apply for those benefits. 
While this limitation may go against the logic behind the passage of the 
Arrears Act, it was the only thing the government could possibly have done to allow 
arrears and still be solvent. Accounting by the Bureau for arrears between passage 
of the Arrears Act and the end of fiscal year 1885 revealed that the Bureau had paid 
out $179,400,000, well more than the prior estimates from the Bureau or 
Department of the Interior4. Despite the enormous costs related to arrears and 
subsequent new pensioners that began to receive benefits posed to the government, 
the dreaded deficits from the legislation never materialized due to large revenues 
collected by the government. See Table 2 for an overview of the actual 
disbursements from 1877 to 1899, split out by arrears and regular pensions. 
3 Oliver p. 60. 
4 Glasson p. 177. 
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The large government surpluses ofthe 1880's and the losses by Republicans 
in the 1884 election provided an impetus for yet another change in the pension 
legislation. The government surpluses were not created from individual income 
taxes, but from tariffs, duties, and other such fees imposed by Congress on trade. As 
this money accumulated, politicians and citizens believed that it could be spent 
elsewhere rather than sitting as a surplus. Coinciding with the rise of the deficits, 
the Republicans lost the 1884 election and lost their final chance to repeal the 
limiting date imposed by the Arrears Act. Every time that a repeal of the date was 
proposed, it was either tabled by Congressional Committees or did not pass either 
House with the necessary two-thirds majority vote (this being a time when such a 
number was required for passage of legislation in both the House as well as the 
Senate). Faced with these factors, politicians and their supporters began looking 
around for other ways to spend the surpluses on the veterans. 
They found a solution in the form of a service or dependence pension. It had 
been noted for several years by the various veterans groups like the Grand Army of 
the Republic that numerous former soldiers were in need of some assistance but 
were still not covered by the general pension law. One of the many suggestions to fix 
this was the creation of a separate pension for veterans that would allow for 
benefits dependent on disabilities regardless of their cause and a minimum of 
military service. The service requirement was often trivial, almost always a 
requirement of three months during the Civil War, and the benefits were 
significantly less than those of the previous legislation-twelve dollars a month. 
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This proposal proved to be popular among the veterans and Congress. After 
passage in both Houses, a bill was sent to President Cleveland for his signature. 
Much to everyone's surprise, Cleveland vetoed the bill on February 11,1887. He 
reasoned that such a system would present plenty of opportunities for abuse and 
that the soldiers already had been generously compensated. He wrote that the 
veterans "Have received such compensation for military service as has never been 
received by soldiers before, since mankind first went to war."s He also noted that 
while such a law was recently enacted for the surviving Mexican-American War 
veterans only because they were old and few left living, the veterans of the Civil War 
were quite numerous and only middle-aged and thus did not deserve such 
treatment. 
The negative feelings over Cleveland's action likely lost him the 1888 election 
since veterans were motivated in large numbers to vote against Cleveland. His 
opponent, Benjamin Harrison, had stated his support for further pension relief, 
making him an ideal choice for voting veterans. One of Harrison's first actions after 
becoming President was to appoint the rather unscrupulous James Tanner as the 
Commissioner of Pensions. Rerating old pension claims and providing kickbacks to 
pension agents marked Tanner's administration over the Bureau. After his 
resignation, Green 8. Raum replaced him as Commissioner. Raum continued to 
provide kickbacks to pension agents and lawyers. In spite of, or perhaps because of, 
the Harrison Commissioners' actions, large support for a disability pension existed. 
S Glasson p. 211. 
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President Harrison signed the new pension law on June 27, 1890. The law 
created an entirely new pension plan that the veterans could participate in. 
Participants were required to have served at least ninety days in service during the 
Civil War, but they could claim benefits for any disability regardless of the cause and 
timing. Benefits would be apportioned between six to twelve dollars per month, 
based on the inability of the veteran to perform manual labor. The act also opened 
the new plan to widows whose husbands had died of any cause, provided they had 
been married prior to the act's passage. While the plan allowed for almost every 
Union veteran and their widow regardless of financial standing, the payments under 
the new plan were much less than the older plan and an applicant could only draw a 
pension from one of the plans. 
The law remained unchanged until May of 1900 when a new bill was enacted 
to amend certain parts of the 1890 law. These changes were deemed to be necessary 
to give the Commissioner of Pensions legal authority to make liberal claim decisions. 
This grew from the questionable practices of Commissioner Raum under President 
Harrison and the subsequent outlawing of those practices by the second Cleveland 
Administration, as well as the hesitancy on the part of the McKinley Administration 
to change the Cleveland-era practices. As part ofthe new bill, a claimant could 
combine several small disabilities into a larger aggregate claim. In addition, widows 
of former veterans could still draw a monthly pension and have an annual income 
up to $250. 
Over the next decade or so, the push for changes in the pension law began to 
take the form of service and age pensions. These were pensions whose amounts 
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payable were determined through the length of a veteran's service and his age at 
application. This structure had a big advantage to the veterans for two reasons. The 
first benefit of such a system was that the population of veterans was getting older, 
with many nearing or attaining age sixty. The second advantage to this proposed 
pension was that it removed the condition of disability. Age and military service 
would be the only conditions for benefit payments. 
On February 6, 1907, President Roosevelt signed into law a service and age 
pension. It provided a flat benefit of twelve dollars per month to any veteran who 
had served ninety days and reached age sixty-two. Various older ages were chosen 
for increased amounts, with twenty dollars a month awarded to those age seventy-
five and older being the highest. Since most veterans were already in the lowest age 
bracket or just about to reach it, most participants in the 1890 plan switched over to 
the new plan to get the higher benefits and to take advantage of the even easier 
eligibility requirements6. Further acts in 1908 and 1912 removed the income limits 
on widows seeking pensions under the system, increased the benefits, and allowed 
for greater payments for longer military service. A few later acts would increase the 
benefit amounts, but the veterans' power began to wane and the Civil War pension 
plan faded into the background of other political causes. 
6 Glasson p. 250. 
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3. Data and Actuarial Assumptions 
As the overview of the history of the pension plan revealed, cost estimates 
were often wildly different from actual payments, both in annual and in aggregate 
terms. Many of these estimates were based off of prior data from the Pension 
Bureau, with some discretionary adjustments made by the author of the estimate. 
Missing from these cost estimates are the effects of the time value of money and 
human mortality. These two concepts and their application form a large part of 
modern actuarial science, and thus modern pension valuation. An overview of the 
concepts and the process of the actuarial valuation will help set the results in an 
understandable context for those without an actuarial background. 
The first step for any valuation is to obtain population data, or information 
about the veterans and their spouses. The United States National Archives and 
Record Administration (NARA) maintains microfilm records of military service, 
medical treatment, and pension applications by soldiers and veterans from the Civil 
War. This becomes problematic when trying to conduct an actuarial valuation 
because the methods used require population data in a digital format. Thankfully, 
previous researchers have done exactly that. The Early Indicators of Later Work 
Levels, Disease, and Death project collected and digitized a random sample of Union 
army soldiers' records from NARA. As noted by the project's head, Robert W. Fogel 
of the University of Chicago's Center for Population Economics, "The goal of 
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this project was to construct datasets, suitable for longitudinal studies of factors 
affecting the aging process."7 The dataset itself contains information ranging from 
an individual's birthday to occupation to pension amounts awarded by the Pension 
Bureau. For the purposes of this valuation, only a few fields were chosen for use. 
These fields include the following: recidnum for a unique identifier, rb_datel for a 
soldier's birthday, wb_datel for a spouse's birthday, and appdtOl - appdt20 for 
pension application dates. 
The next step in calculating these future liabilities was to set the actuarial 
assumptions, and the first of these is to determine a mortality table to use. As a 
refresher, a mortality table is simply a table containing various probabilities of 
dying within a given year, split out by age. A mortality table thus contains a 
numerical answer to a question such as the probability of a twenty-year-old dying 
within the coming year. By 1868 enough American mortality experience had been 
observed to create the first American Experience Mortality Table, based partly on 
experience from 1843 to 1858 by the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York. 
The probabilities included in the table tended to be more conservative and were 
used in regulatory valuations because the represented lives tended to be shorter 
than otherwise, making for increased expected payments by a life insurance 
companyB. This makes the mortality table suitable for valuing a veteran population 
that can reasonably be expected to have poorer mortality (shorter lives) than the 
general population overall. While a mortality table based on exact experience would 
have been most useful in the calculations, a mortality table from as close to the 
7 Fogel et aI, p. l. 
B Glover p. 224. 
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veterans' generation as possible is the best option available for the mortality 
assumption. 
The next part of the assumptions revolves around disability. While 
information about the various disabilities suffered by the veterans over time would 
have been the best information to aid in the evaluation, this data is largely 
unavailable. The disability probabilities used in the valuation are instead based off 
of pension application dates by veterans from the data source, split out by year of 
application. Since the benefit payments only occur when the veteran or widow 
applied for the pension and was accepted, application dates are a good source for 
disability information. In order to control for mUltiple applications by the same 
individual to take advantage of increased benefits in later years, the application 
dates used for disability probabilities were the earliest pension application dates of 
the associated data fields. 
The third piece of information needed for constructing an actuarial present 
value for the liabilities of the plan is the valuation's interest rate. The Civil War 
pension plan was not a funded plan, and so there were no assets set aside to 
specifically pay pension claims. Because of this, choosing an interest rate becomes a 
bit more difficult. Social insurance programs like Medicare and Social Security, 
however, provide a solution to this quandary. These programs involve a trust fund 
that specifically buys US Treasury bonds with the tax revenues they receive. The 
interest rate to use should then be the Treasury rate during the relevant time 
period, roughly the post-Civil War era through the World War I-era. Looking at the 
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Treasury yields during this range shows that rates stayed between 3.5% and 4.5%9. 
The simple average of these is 4%, and this is the chosen interest rate for the 
valuation. 
The final piece of information needed for the valuation is the benefit levels to 
assign to each veteran. While actual data for pension benefits paid to some of the 
veterans was included in the Early Indicators project data, this information did not 
exist for many of the individuals or often did not match up to any specific disability 
listed on Table 1. This implies that there was a fair amount of grading done by the 
examining surgeons in determining the benefits. In an effort to provide a more 
conservative estimate than that commonly assumed by the government at the time, 
I am assuming that the benefit to be assigned to an individual is the same as the 
benefit assigned to another. By conservative, a tendency to slightly overestimate the 
liability as opposed to underestimating it is meant. Thus, I am using the simple 
average of all the potential pensionable disabilities' payments and assuming all 
disabilities are equally likely. For the date of valuation, the average benefit would 
then be $24.21 per month, or $72.63 quarterly according to the timing of the actual 
payments. 
After assumptions have been set, the valuation can occur. The valuation's 
calculation consists of two parts, those being the actuarial present value of a general 
disability as well as a widow's pension. For the first part of the calculation, the 
potential liability in any given year of the valuation, k, would be the disability benefit 
as determined by the examining surgeon. To turn this into an actuarial present 
9 Clark, Craig, and Wilson p. 257. 
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value, this benefit amount must be discounted with interest and the chosen 
decrements from the assumptions. 
Discounting for disability and mortality merely means that the benefit in year 
k is multiplied by the probability of the veteran (listed below as age x) and his 
dependant (age y), if a spouse was listed, surviving all decrements until time k and 
the probability of the veteran becoming disabled and applying for the pension at 
time k. Once the veteran has become disabled, he and his dependant are entitled to 
an annuity of quarterly benefit payments, here assumed to continue the remaining 
lifetime of the last person to die. This is simply the expected value for a disability 
pension in anyone year in time; the valuation requires the sum of all these actuarial 
present values in all relevant years for the plan. In actuarial notation, this is 
'" p(r)q(d)jj(4) v k+ IBene'it ~ k xy x+ k x+ k :y +k :I' k 
k (1) 
The second part of the valuation calculation is very similar to the first, but 
with a few differences. Since the second part of the calculation is the pension for 
widows, rather than having the benefit in a given year multiplied by the probability 
of becoming disabled in that year, it is instead multiplied by the probability that the 
veteran will die that year. The benefit is then paid to the widow or other dependant 
for the remainder of her life. In actuarial notation, 
'" (r ) (m) ··(4 ) h l B ,r, ~ k P xy q x+k a y+k v eneJ It k 
k (2) 
The actuarial present value ofthe total pension benefits is then the sum of (1) and 
(2). Please see Appendix 1 for an example of the calculations for a sample test life. 
The calculations above are performed for every life in the veterans' data 
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obtained. Because the data is a sample of the total veterans' records housed by the 
National Archives, the final liability results will need to be scaled up to a population 
approximating the size of the total American Civil War veteran population. The total 
Union army during the Civil War was 2,213,363 men, of which 224,097 were 
casualties10. Thus 1,989,266 men survived the war, and since the population size 
included in the dataset was 35,570 soldiers, the liability results should be scaled up 
by a factor of approximately 55.93. This is a reasonable assumption to make since 
we are assuming the lives to be independent of one another and as Fogel states, 
"Work done for the Early Indicators Project's grant proposal indicates that the 
sample is representative of the contemporary white male population who served in 
the Union Army.//11 Since the sample is representative, simple scaling should provide 
a good estimate of the actuarial present value of the pension plan, at least for the 
purposes of this valuation. 
10 Leland and Oboroceanu p. 2. 
11 Fogel et al p. 15. 
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4. Actuarial Valuation Results and Analysis 
Appendix 2 contains an overview of the Excel files and the dataset used in the 
calculations. Actual payments made by the Pension Bureau for 1861 through 1921 
are detailed in Table 3. The results of the actuarial valuation for the American Civil 
War pension plan as of passage of the Consolidation Act on March 3, 1873 can be 
found in Table 4. The results display the expected new liability in each year for the 
valuation by that attributable to the general disability pension and that liability from 
the widows of deceased veterans. Total sums are also displayed in terms of actuarial 
present values, located at the bottom of the table. Note that this table contains the 
results from combining the effects of increased benefit levels in later plan years as 
well as smoothed disability rates, as discussed below. 
A cursory examination of the 1873 valuation results shows several things. 
The first item of interest is the very large spikes in liability occurring in years 1880, 
1881, 1890, 1891, and 1892. The second observation centers on the widows' 
pension liability. When compared to the general disability pension, the widow's 
liability is much smaller than the general disability pension liability until 1894, after 
which time the widows' liability becomes a much larger contributor to the totals in 
each year. The final fact to note is the slight uptick in liability in 1931. 
The actual pension payments display behavior somewhat different from the 
estimate. While the valuation predicted a large increase in liability for the period of 
1880 to 1881, the actual payments do not show quite as large of an increase. Total 
disbursements for that period were just above one hundred million dollars, over 
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those two years. In addition to this increase there, the increase in payments for the 
period from 1891 to 1893 was roughly four hundred million dollars. After this time 
period, the pension payments remained relatively steady around 140 million dollars 
through 1907, at which time they increased again. By 1921, the pension payments 
had again increased and were rising. 
Obviously comparing the actuarial valuation to the actual disbursements isn't 
necessarily a straightforward comparison. There are several crucial differences 
between the two amounts that create differences. One source for differences comes 
from the scope of the valuation. The valuation used disability rates that extended 
out to 1931, meaning that there were still new pensioners claiming a pension in 
1931. The actual payments only extend to 1921 due to a lack of data for the 
remaining years. Additionally, some of the totals for the later years include 
payments made to the veterans and widows of the Spanish-American War and 
World War I. This contributed to larger benefit payments in those years than would 
have otherwise occurred. Unfortunately data from the Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Pensions for this period is spotty at best, and newspapers usually 
only reported whole amounts of benefits dispensed during each year without a 
breakdown as to which groups received what amounts. 
A second possible source for the divide between the valuation's expected 
payments and the actual benefit payments made could be from the benefits assumed 
in the valuation. Initially, I assumed that each pensionable disability was equally 
likely. This assumption was not made naively, but rather because data for the 
probabilities of each disability and the exact methods of grading that the surgeons 
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applied are unknown. Since the purpose of the valuation was to estimate the liability 
as best as possible, but also taking a more conservative position than that of the 
government at the time, simply averaging the benefits seems like a reasonable 
response. Additionally, I assumed that the benefit remained constant at the levels as 
described by the Consolidation Act of 1873. Further increases were therefore not 
measured. As a supplement, the valuation was recalculated using increasing benefit 
levels that corresponded to the average benefits in each year as indicated by Table 
1. 
Another source for noted differences in the behavior of the valuation could 
lie in the disability rates. The valuation for the pension plan was severely 
handicapped by the lack of any kind of established disability table for Civil War 
veterans for the specific pensionable disabilities. As noted before, since this data 
was unavailable, the pension application dates for the veterans had to serve as a 
proxy. While the new expected liability as shown in Graph l's large spikes following 
the passage of the Arrears and Dependant Pension Acts may seem to suggest poor 
disability rates, it is important to remember that the spikes correspond to the 
expected present value of a pension that would start in those years. The seemingly 
stranger problem with the disability rates is the steep decrease in disability rates 
after 1893. This decline is unavoidable since most veterans would already be 
receiving a pension by this time-the various benefit increases and the veterans' 
lobbying groups would surely have convinced the vast majority of men able to apply 
for the pension to do so. Some veterans did apply for the pension after the passage 
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of these laws, but they were much fewer than the men who had applied immediately 
after these changes. 
In an effort to try to smooth the liability values to remove the sharp peaks 
and the zero values for later years, the disability rates were graduated in a separate 
calculation. For the purpose of the valuation, a simple three-year moving average 
was created for the new graduated disability rates. The previous year, the current 
year, and the next year were all weighted equally in the average. Thankfully for the 
purposes here, disability rates existed before the first year of the valuation and a 
few at the end of the valuation. This means that the endpoint problem, as detailed by 
Dick London, doesn't apply here12. These new rates were then used to recalculate 
the initial valuation to produce a second estimate. 
The following Table 5 shows the results of the various estimates, including 
the effects of using increasing benefit levels and the smoothed disability rates, as 
well as the actual present value of the payments made on the part of the Pension 
Bureau. 
12 London p. 34. 
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Table S: Comparison of the Estimates' Actuarial Present Values 
Actual 
Initial Estimate 
Using Increasing 
Benefits 
With 3-year Averaged 
Disability Rates 
Estimate with Both 
Increased Benefits and 
New Disability Rates 
Present Value as of 
March 3, 1873 
$1,971,750,439.05 
$1,482,323,416.33 
$2,201,743,708.04 
$1,335,493,766.92 
$2,046,977,303.87 
Percent Difference 
from Actual 
-24.82% 
11.66% 
-32.27% 
3.82% 
From here, it's easy to see which of the estimates was the most accurate at 
reproducing the present value of the actual payments, the final estimate combining 
the increasing benefits and the new disability rates. My calculations overestimated 
the liability when using increased benefits, but underestimated with the smoothed 
disability rates. Combining both elements together yields a more realistic picture of 
the size of the pension plan's liabilities. 
Another source for differences that is unaccounted for by either benefits or 
disability rates is in the valuation's treatment of marriage. Under the assumptions, if 
a veteran had a wife listed, that was then valued as a last survivor status. While this 
allows for proper valuation of married veterans, it ignores bachelors, divorcees, and 
widowers who remarry. This has the potential for significant problems in the 
calculations. Civil War veterans were known to marry young women when they 
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were quite old, some prompted by nothing more than sharing a pension for 
economic considerations and others wanting to share normal love. As the New York 
Times reported on the death of the last Union widow in 2003, "She received a $70 
check each month from the Veterans Administration."13 This means that there could 
be significant liability for pensions paid out to veterans in their later years as they 
married much younger women. Predicting remarriage and older-younger marriages 
would likely require a different mortality assumption for the younger women and 
rates of remarriage among veterans. Since this would involve many more 
assumptions and calculations, this was not included in any of the calculations, but it 
is something to consider incorporating into a future valuation. 
13 New York Times, 21 January, 2003. 
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5. Conclusion 
The differences in the valuation's liability and the actual payments may seem 
great, but factors such as the disability rates or increased benefits seem to explain 
much of the discrepancy. The actuarial assumptions were chosen so as to create a 
more conservative estimate (again meaning overestimate) for the cost of the 
pension plan. The interest rate of 4% is low, providing higher present values for the 
expected payments. The mortality table is likewise moderate with shorter life 
expectancies than the normal population, much less disabled Civil War veterans, 
tending to underestimate the true liability. Benefits were assumed to be a simple 
average of the total pensionable disabilities, likely leading to a higher average 
benefit level than was actually observed. These contributed to a higher expected 
liability than would otherwise have been calculated. 
Governmental calculations, when contemplated, were often far off of the 
actual disbursements. Continual changes in the pension laws created increased 
benefits, generous arrears, and liberal disability statuses contributed to the vastly 
increased costs over time. While the pension plan became efficient at providing 
benefits to disabled veterans and widows, it also grew into a quasi-political favor 
system by which politicians could win support from the voting veterans. Despite its 
flaws, the Civil War pension plan was a vital part of the postwar history as well as 
serving as the forerunner for the modern public sector pension system. 
Table 1: Statutory Rates for Permanent Specific Disabilities l 
From From 
From July4, From March 3, From June 6, FromJune 4, From June 4, February 28, From June 17 From March From March From March from August from August February 12,1 From March 1 From July 12,1 From January 1 From March I From April 8, 
Disabilities 1864 1865 1866 1872 1874 1877 1878 3,1879 3, 1883 3,1885 4,1886 27, 1888 1889 4, 1890 1892 IS, 1903 2, 1903 1904 
loss of both hands $ 25.00 $ 31.25 $ 50.00 $ 72.00 $ 100.00 
loss of both feet 20.00 31.25 50.00 72.00 I I I I $ 100.00 Loss of sight of both eyes 25.00 31.25 50.00 72.00 I $ 100.00 
Loss of sight of one eye, the sight of 
the other having been lost before 
enlistment $ 25.00 31.25 50.00 72.00 100.00 
loss of one hand and one foot $ 20.00 24.00 $ 36.00 60.00 
loss of a hand or iii foot 15.00 18.00 $ 24.00 $ 30.00 40.00 
loss of an arm at or above the 
elbow or iii leg at or above the knee 15.00 18.00 I 24.00 I I I I 30.00 I I 36.00 I I I I I I 46.00 
loss of either a leg at the hip joint or 
an arm at the shoulder joint, or so 
near as to prevent the use of an 
artificial limb 45.00 55.00 
loss of leg at the hip joint 15.00 24.00 $ 37.50 45.00 55.00 
loss of an arm at the shoulder joint 15.00 18.00 24.00 $ 37.50 45.00 55.00 
Total disability in both hands 25.00 31.25 
Total disability in both feet 20.00 31.25 
Total disability in one hand and one 
foot 20.00 24.00 36.00 I I I I I I I I 60.00 
Total disability in one hand or one 
foot 15.00 18.00 
2400 I 
I 
3000 I 
I I I I I 
40.00 
Total disability in the arm or leg 15.00 18.00 24.00 36.00 46.00 
Disability equivalent to the loss of a 
hand or a foot (third grade) 15.00 18.00 I I I I I 24.00 
Incapacity to perform manual labor 
(second grade) 20.00 24.00 I I I I 30.00 
Regular aid and attendance (first 
grade) 25.00 31.25 
5000 I 
I I I I I I I I $ 
72.00 
Frequent and periodical, not 
constant, aid and attendance 
(intermediate grade) 
13·00 I I $ 30·00 I I $ 50.00 I $ Total deafness 40.00 
1 Reproduced from Glasson p. 133 
Table 2: Arrears Payments for 1877 through 18992 
Fiscal 
First Payments 
Pensions Exclusive of 
Total Disbursements2 Year First Payments 
1877 $ 3,284,937.12 $ 24,837,746.36 $ 28,122,683.48 
1878 2,992,352.17 23,538,439.93 26,530,792.10 
1879 5,763,758.60 27,725,979.96 33,489,738.56 
1880 12,468,191.20 44,558,802.92 57,026,994.12 
1881 23,628,176.61 26,458,498.14 50,086,674.75 
1882 26,421,669.19 27,408,390.05 53,830,059.24 
1883 29,906,753 .94 29,915,480.89 59,822,234.83 
1884 23,413,815.10 32,682,126.58 56,095,941.68 
1885 27,115,912.21 37,817,375.91 64,933,288.12 
1886 22,137,054.16 41,621,591.49 63,758,645.65 
1887 25,166,990.06 48,300,591.81 73,467,581.87 
1888 22,299,605.46 56,568,841.28 78,868,446.74 
1889 24,422,349.13 66,83 2,764.15 91,255,113.28 
1890 38,721,866.03 66,806,314.35 105,528,180.38 
1891 38,652,274.31 78,326,898.41 116,979,172.72 
1892 45,114,167.68 94,045,188.71 139,159,356.39 
1893 33,756,549.38 122,983,917.76 156,740,467.14 
1894 11,917,359.58 127,887,101.47 139,804,461.05 
1895 11,451,133.01 128,356,204.29 139,807,337.30 
1896 11,289,278.48 126,925,483.46 138,214,761.94 
1897 12,575,601.40 127,374,115.95 139,949,717.35 
1898 15,542,914.03 129,108,965.77 144,651,879.80 
1899 9,247,957.75 129,107,095.20 138,355,052.95 
Total $ 477,290,666.60 $ 1,619,187,914.84 $ 2,096,478,581.44 
2 Reproduced from Glasson p. 203. The total disbursements differ from Table 1 because this table is based 
Statistical Abstract of the United States and not the Report of the Commisskmer of Pensions. 
Table 3: Pension Disbursements and Costs for 1866 through 19213 
Fiscal Paid as Pensions 
Cost, Maitenance, Total 
Number of 
Year and Expenses Pensioners 
1866 $ 15,450,549.88 $ 407,165.00 $ 15,857,714.88 126,722 
1867 20,784,789.69 490,977.35 21,275,767.04 155,474 
1868 23,101,509.36 553,020.34 23,654,529.70 169,643 
1869 28,513,247.27 564,526.81 29,077,774.08 187,963 
1870 29,351,488.78 600,997.86 29,952,486.64 198,686 
1871 28,518,792.62 863,079.00 29,381,871.62 207,495 
1872 29,752,746.81 951,253.00 30,703,999.81 232,229 
1873 26,982,063.89 1,003,200.64 27,985,264.53 238,411 
1874 30,206,778.99 966,794.13 31,173,573.12 236,241 
1875 29,270,404.76 982,695.35 30,253,100.11 234,821 
1876 27,936,209.53 1,015,078.81 28,951,288.34 232,137 
1877 28,182,821. 72 1,034,459.33 29,217,281.05 232,104 
1878 26,786,009.44 1,032,500.09 27,818,509.53 223,998 
1879 33,664,428.92 837,734.14 34,502,163.06 242,755 
1880 56,689,229.08 935,027.28 57,624,256.36 250,802 
1881 50,583,405.35 1,072,059.64 51,655,464.99 268,830 
1882 54,313,172.05 1,466,236.01 55,779,408.06 285,697 
1883 60,427,573.81 2,591,648.29 63,019,222.10 303,658 
1884 57,912,387.47 2,835,181.00 60,747,568.47 322,756 
1885 65,171,937.12 3,392,576.34 68,564,513.46 345,125 
1886 64,091,142.90 3,245,016.61 67,336,159.51 365,783 
1887 73,752,997.08 3,753,400.91 77,506,397.99 406,007 
1888 78,950,501.67 3,515,057.27 82,465,558.94 452,557 
1889 88,842,720.58 3,466,968.40 92,309,688.98 489,725 
1890 106,093,850.39 3,526,382.13 109,620,232.52 537,944 
1891 117,312,690.50 4,700,636.44 122,013,326.94 676,160 
1892 139,394,147.11 4,898,665.80 144,292,812.91 876,068 
1893 156,906,637.94 4,867,734.42 161,774,372.36 966,012 
1894 139,986,726.17 3,963,976.31 143,950,702.48 969,544 
1895 139,812,294.30 4,338,020.21 144,150,314.51 970,524 
1896 138,220,704.46 3,991,375 .61 142,212,080.07 970,678 
1897 139,949,717.35 3,987,783.07 143,937,500.42 976,014 
1898 144,651,879.80 4,114,091.46 148,765,971.26 993,714 
1899 138,355,052.95 4,147,517.73 142,502,570.68 991,519 
1900 138,462,130.65 3,841,706.74 142,303,837.39 993,529 
1901 138,531,483.84 3,868,795.44 142,400,279.28 997,735 
1902 137,504,267.99 3,831,378.96 141,335,646.95 999,446 
1903 137,759,653.71 3,993,216.79 141,752,870.50 996,545 
1904 141,093,571.49 3,849,366.25 144,942,937.74 994,762 
1905 141,142,861.33 3,721,832.82 144,864,694.15 998,441 
1906 139,000,288.25 3,523,269.51 142,523,557.76 985,971 
1907 138,155,412.46 3,309,110.44 141,464,522.90 967,371 
1908 153,093,086.27 2,800,963.36 155,894,049.63 951,687 
1909 161,973,703.77 2,852,583.73 164,826,287.50 946,194 
1910 159,974,056.08 2,657,673.86 162,631,729.94 921,083 
1911 157,325,160.35 2,517,127.06 159,842,287.41 892,098 
1912 152,986,433.72 2,448,857.31 155,435,291.03 860,294 
1913 174,171,660.80 2,543,246.59 176,714,907.39 820,200 
1914 172,417,546.26 2,066,507.15 174,484,053.41 785,239 
1915 165,518,266.14 1,779,860.30 167,298,126.44 748,147 
1916 159,155,089.92 1,656,722.33 160,811,812.25 709,572 
1917 160,895,053.94 1,562,854.96 162,457,908.90 673,111 
1918 179,835,328.75 1,527,615.61 181,362,944.36 646,895 
1919 222,159,292.70 1,433,191.67 223,592,484.37 624,427 
1920 213,295,314.65 1,395,014.09 214,690,328.74 592,190 
1921 258,715,842.54 1,389,921.55 260,105,764.09 566,053 
Total $ 5,993,086,115.35 $ 138,683,653.30 $ 6,131,769,768.65 
1 Reproduced from Glasson p. 273 
Table 4: Expected Additional Liability Per Plan Year 
Fiscal Year 
Genera l Disability 
Pension 
Widows' Pension Total Pension 
1874 $ 25,415,698.86 $ 14,261,293.55 $ 39,676,992.41 
1875 $ 36,468,534.14 $ 13,962,938.07 50,431,472.21 
1876 $ 46,152,059.11 $ 13,741,535.42 59,893,594.54 
1877 $ 57,175,952.76 $ 13,545,418.24 70,721,370.99 
1878 $ 62,508,877 .28 $ 13,344,120.59 75,852,997.86 
1879 $ 139,526,283.42 $ 13,146,354.08 152,672,637.51 
1880 $ 208,217,451.93 $ 12,834,539.22 221,051,991.15 
1881 $ 204,840,793.55 $ 12,409,227.38 217,250,020.93 
1882 $ 149,897,339.21 $ 11,992,540.31 161,889,879.52 
1883 $ 101,824,463.13 $ 11,683,335.67 113,507,798.79 
1884 $ 105,810,506.50 $ 11,4 71, 704.03 117,282,210.53 
1885 $ 97,393,966.77 $ 11,265,661.89 108,659,628.67 
1886 $ 92,133,403.43 $ 11,079,250.00 103,212,653.42 
1887 $ 110,548,091.08 $ 10,907,799.98 121,455,891.06 
1888 $ 123,738,804.66 $ 10,712,167.42 134,450,972.08 
1889 $ 137,922,520.18 $ 10,487,229.90 148,409,750.08 
1890 $ 337,009,323.16 $ 10,232,055.32 347,241,378.48 
1891 $ 363,653,945.10 $ 9,553,485.09 373,207,430.18 
1892 $ 329,117,592.66 $ 8,803,788.89 337,921,381.55 
1893 $ 124,289,276.82 $ 8,093,451.80 132,382,728.62 
1894 $ 51,498,966.57 $ 7,832,269.02 59,331,235.58 
1895 $ 15,263,998.81 $ 7,733,287.56 22,997,286.37 
1896 $ 14,346,031.56 $ 7,717,057.61 22,063,089.16 
1897 $ 19,780,865.25 $ 7,693,784.39 27,474,649.64 
1898 $ 19,449,991.75 $ 7,642,803.66 27,092,795.41 
1899 $ 16,858,117.24 $ 7,577,935.70 24,436,052.94 
1900 $ 10,596,166.68 $ 7,503,939.75 18,100,106.43 
1901 $ 8,956,578.40 $ 7,432,326.55 16,388,904.96 
1902 $ 8,471,729.49 $ 7,346,756.21 15,818,485.69 
1903 $ 7,608,085.37 $ 7,241,675.54 14,849,760.92 
1904 $ 10,448,468.89 $ 7,117,320.38 17,565,789.27 
1905 $ 10,376,208.07 $ 6,963,483.20 17,339,691.28 
1906 $ 9,443,451.22 $ 6,786,911.05 16,230,362.27 
1907 $ 7,631,998.44 $ 6,588,451.18 14,220,449.63 
1908 $ 6,118,036.09 $ 6,371,909.34 12,489,945.43 
1909 $ 4,855,112.66 $ 6,136,583.95 10,991,696.61 
1910 $ 2,653,921.29 $ 5,882,494.35 8,536,415.65 
1911 $ 1,465,255.33 $ 5,615,466.97 7,080,722.30 
1912 $ 1,127,128.07 $ 5,332,828.10 6,459,956.16 
1913 $ 665,917.17 $ 5,032,381. 75 5,698,298.92 
1914 $ 424,586.55 $ 4,717,153.18 5,141,739.73 
1915 $ 107,176.62 $ 4,388,797.67 4,495,974.29 
1916 $ 82,221.23 $ 4,051,201.00 4,133,422.22 
1917 $ 81,765.95 $ 3,706,567.80 3,788,333.75 
1918 $ 52,950.39 $ 3,359,223.39 3,412,173 .78 
1919 $ 37,779.84 $ 3,014,118.25 3,051,898.08 
1920 $ 25,641.53 $ 2,676,052.18 2,701,693.71 
1921 $ 26,932.98 $ 2,349,877.74 2,376,810.72 
1922 $ 17,915.54 $ 2,039,881.56 2,057,797.11 
1923 $ 22,092.77 $ 1,749,784.59 1,771,877.37 
1924 $ 14,951.21 $ 1,482,034.74 1,496,985.94 
1925 $ 11,978.84 $ 1,238,534.95 1,250,513.79 
1926 $ 9,457.94 $ 1,020,077.34 1,029,535.28 
1927 $ 5,878.28 $ 827,063.70 832,941.98 
1928 $ 3,364.59 $ 659,226.81 662,591.40 
1929 $ 1,678.71 $ 515,724.01 517,402.72 
1930 $ 921.94 $ 395,199.44 396,121.39 
1931 $ 22,016,286.70 $ 295,938.12 22,312,224.82 
Present Value $ 1,833,090,682.62 $ 213,886,621.25 $ 2,046,977,303.87 
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Graph 1: Expected Incurred Liability per Year, Assuming Benefit 
Increases and Smoothed Disability Rates 
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Appendix 1 
To better explain the actuarial calculations involved in the valuation, an 
example helps. For the purpose of this example, we will be valuing the actuarial 
present value for a veteran age 30 with a wife currently age 25. For the general 
disability pension, the formula used to calculate the liability is 
" p(T) q (d ) ii( 4 ) vk+ ! Bene'll ~ k xy x+k x+ k :y +k :I' k 
k 
In the first year of the valuation, both individuals are alive and not disabled as of the 
start of the year. Within that first year, we are concerned with the probability that 
the veteran becomes disabled during that year and applies for his pension. This is 
represented by q~~) (the veteran is 30 years old and the first year of the valuation 
means k is set to 0). This probability is then multiplied by the appropriate annuity 
value, a~~:i5 ' to represent quarterly payments for the life of the veteran and his wife 
that would result from becoming disabled. This is also multiplied by the factor, vor 
_1_, to properly discount for the effect of the time value of money. Finally, 
1 + i 
multiplying this value by the benefit (assume the initial $72.60 per quarter from the 
valuation), and then this will be the expected liability to be incurred in the first year 
of the valuation. In mathematical terms, this is 72.6Ov1 q~~) a~~i5 . 
In the second year of the valuation, the veteran and his wife are now 31 and 
26 years old, respectively. From the second year going forward, there is no 
guarantee that both the veteran and his wife are still living and not disabled at the 
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the veteran becoming disabled within that year, so we have to only focus on that 
year for the purposes of the calculations. This means that in the second year, the 
veteran and his wife must not die within the first year, and the veteran must not 
become disabled within the first year. In actuarial terms, this is known as the 
individuals surviving all decrements (mortality and disability) up to the current 
year. For the sample lives here, these survival probabilities are P~~)25 ' which can be 
broken down into p~~) p~~) p~~, ) , where the m stands for the probabilities associated 
with mortality and the d stands for the disability rates. Now that we have 
guaranteed that the individuals survive to the start of the second year, we once 
again multiply this by the probability that the veteran becomes disabled within that 
year, or q~~). We mUltiply by a new annuity factor, aj~~6 ' as well as discount this for 
two years of interest to bring it all back to the valuation date. Including the benefit 
h d I· b 'l' f h d . 726Ov 2 (m) (d) (m) (d) ,, (4) amount, t e expecte la 1 Ity or t e secon year IS . P 30 P 30 P 25 q 31 Q 3 126' 
This process is repeated for every year of the valuation. The number of years 
in the valuation depends on the ages of the veteran and his wife. This is because the 
mortality table used has a limiting age of 95 and the pension payments continue 
until the last survivor of the couple deceases. For the example here, since the wife is 
only 25 years old at the beginning of the valuation, the calculations would include 
values extending out 70 years, even though the veteran would be valued as dead five 
years prior due to the limiting age of the mortality table. All of these values are 
summed up to produce the total expected liability for the one veteran and his wife 
for the general disability pension. 
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For the widows' pension liability, the process is almost identical, except that 
rather than being concerned by the probability that the veteran becomes disabled 
within the valuation year, we are now concerned with the probability that the 
veteran dies. This means that instead of the disability probability q;d l , we want the 
mortality probability q;"'l. The survival probabilities, discount factors, and benefits 
stay the same as in the general disability pension, but the annuity factor changes to 
reflect that the payments now only last for the life of the widow. Thus in the first 
year of the valuation, if the veteran dies, the widow receives quarterly payments for 
the rest of her life, or ai;l in actuarial notation. Again, all the valuation years' values 
are summed up to provide the total expected liability from the widows' pension. 
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Appendix 2 
The electronic files used for the calculations of the liability are included on 
the CD enclosed with this paper. The files themselves comprise three separate files 
used in the calculations. The first of these, Military, Pension, and Medical Records.zip, 
is a copy of the dataset used from the Early Indicators project. It is a .zip file, 
meaning it is compressed, and when un compressed it contains folders with 
informational PDF files and the dataset files themselves. The second file included 
here is the initial valuation Excel file, Valuationl.xlsx. Its various spreadsheets are 
labeled to identify their contents. The final file is the second valuation Excel file, 
Valuation2.xlsx. This file contains calculations based off of the smoothed disability 
rates. The spreadsheets are formatted identically to the first Excel file to remove any 
confusion when trying to find information. 
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